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Chapter 2. Competition, stability and moral hazard: the tension between financial 
regulation and State aid control 




The events of 2008 and their aftermath underscored how the priorities of financial 
regulation and those of State aid control can come into direct conflict, and the hard policy 
choices that must inevitably be made as a consequence. The aim of this chapter is to tease 
out this tension at a relatively general level – to set the scene conceptually before the 
more detailed chapters following explore its different aspects in more concrete scenarios. 
First, this chapter discusses regulatory intent and dominant policy concerns of both of 
these discrete legal regimes highlighting their difficult but necessary interdependence. It 
discusses how and whether the central concern of financial regulation, to minimize risk of 
bank failure thereby retaining systemic stability, might itself raise moral issues and harm 
competitiveness. Second, it conducts an assessment of the performance of the State aid 
regime during the financial crisis in order to gauge whether the systemic nature of the 
crisis had some bearing on the way in which the State aid rules were applied in times of 
extreme urgency, taking into account threats to both banking stability and member state 
stability. Third, the chapter traces the transition to Banking Union which, although still 
very much a work in progress, should ensure that during future crises in the European 
banking sector, it is not a combination of member state governments and the State aid 
legal regime that take command of crisis management.  
 
a) Context: regulatory fragmentation but interdependence 
 
  
Prior to the banking crisis of 2008, the focus of European policy in the financial sector was 
on developing a single market which would integrate banking and financial services. It was 
hoped that a single currency combined with the measures taken as a result of the 1999 
Financial Services Action Plan would lead to greater competitiveness, growth, prosperity 
and sense of cohesion in Europe.1 However, even the best laid, best intentioned and best 
executed plans can be thwarted by unexpected events. Events in global financial markets 
and the effect they have had on Europe’s banks since2008 have stymied the efforts of the 
1999 Lisbon summit where the Financial Services Action Plan was drawn up. How different 
it all appears now as tighter degrees of banking and monetary union emerge within the 
Euro area as a response to crisis, while at the same time the member state that hosts the 
largest financial center in the EU looks for a new legal and political settlement with the 
rest of Europe.2  
One lesson from the crisis that devastated the European banking sector in 2008 
was that, in the absence of a genuinely supranational regime for regulation,  it remained 
for the State aid regime alone to police the measures taken by member states to stabilize, 
rescue and resolve banks established within their territories. For in times of financial 
distress and systemic crisis, national governments look to protect first and foremost the 
deposits of their electorates, as well as the jobs they have within financial institutions 
established there. Supporting a border-free European single market in banking and 
financial services comes a distant second. As the experience of 2008 demonstrated, banks 
established in other member states can suddenly be faced with interventions and 
                                                            
1  Communication from the Commission of 11 May 1999 Financial Services: Implementing the 
Framework for Financial Markets – Action Plan (COM(1999)232) (Financial Services Action Plan 1999), not yet 
published; Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-10) [2006] OJ C65/134.  
2  Announcement of national referendum on a new status for the UK within the EU by British Prime 
Minister on 22 February 2016 <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-eu-
reform-and-referendum-22-february-2016> accessed 15 April 2016. 
  
measures justified in terms of their contribution to “financial stability” despite their 
discriminatory, protectionist and anti-competitive effects. Given the enormous policy 
development and legislative effort that has gone into the European Banking Union in the 
post-crisis period (and which are considered in outline below and in detail elsewhere in 
this work), it is easy to forget the near absence of a “communautaire” response both 
during and in the immediate aftermath of the banking crisis of 2008 itself.3 In the face of 
often uncoordinated national intervention, rescue and stabilization actions being taken by 
member states to shore up both individual institutional and systemic stability, it was left 
to the European Union’s State aid regime to oversee each and every member state’s 
intervention in Europe’s banks and try to prevent further destabilization of the European 
financial system, as well as damage to the integrity of the single market for European 
banking.4  
 
b) Banking regulation and financial stability 
 
Legal and regulatory frameworks designed to enable the business of banking are 
motivated by a number of objectives.5 These commonly range from the paternalistic and 
protective within specific categories, for example, the conduct of business requirements 
or depositor protection schemes, through to prudential financial resources requirements 
designed to enhance safety and soundness of regulated institutions, such as regulatory 
capital requirements. Lessons learned from the 2008 banking crisis have resulted in 
                                                            
3  John Thornhill, ‘Brussels Looks Like Bewildered Bystander Amid Turmoil’ Financial Times (18 October 
2015). 
4  Francesco De Cecco, ‘State Aid Law Meets Financial Regulation’ in Joanna Gray and Orkun Akseli 
(eds), Financial Regulation in Crisis? The Role of Law and the Failure of Northern Rock (Edward Elgar 2011). 
5  Charles Goodhart, Philipp Hartmann, David Llewellyn, Liliana Rojas-Suarez and Steven Weisbrod, 
Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (Routledge 1998) (Goodhart et al. 1998). 
  
national, European and global reforms that make the protection of financial stability a 
more explicit and central objective than it has been hitherto.6 This has led to a new 
paradigm in financial regulation, commonly termed “macroprudential” regulation7 and it 
has financial stability at its core.  
This development has fuelled renewed scholarly interest in the politics of financial 
regulation as well as its capacity to prevent, manage and respond to crises and instability 
through its practical and operational aspects. The same is true of the State aid legal 
regime.8 Europe’s banking crisis forced the State aid authorities to fill the void of any 
effective pan-European bank resolution body, with power to override national 
governmental interventions in banks in the interests of stability of national financial 
systems and protecting their national depositors’ funds. It thus fell to the State aid regime 
to prevent further segmentation of the single market in banking and to ensure that 
concerns about financial stability did not crowd out the importance of promoting 
competition – even in times of strain and distress to institutions and systems. This is a 
                                                            
6  Bank of England Act 1998, 2A (Financial Stability Objective of Bank of England) and Part 1A (Financial 
Stability Strategy); European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union 
macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB 
Regulation) [2010] OJ L331/1; at the global level financial stability now informs much international standard 
setting following the formal establishment of the Financial Stability Board in April 2009 (see G20 Communiqué 
on Strengthening the International Financial System, 2 April 2009 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf> accessed 12 September 2016).  
7  Gabriele Galati and Richhild Moessner, ‘Macroprudential Policy – A Literature Review’ (Bank for 
International Settlements, Working Paper No. 337, 2011) <http://www.bis.org/publ/work337.htm> accessed 
15 April 2016. 
8  Hussein Kassim and Bruce Lyons, ‘The New Political Economy of EU State Aid Policy’ [2013] JICT 13, 
1. 
  
delicate role at the best of times,  particularly in such a politicized sector as banking.9 
State aid law performed a role that had not been originally envisaged and has been 
shaped and altered by it as a result.  
 
c) Tensions: complex interaction between stability and moral hazard concerns and 
competition  
 
Central to both the financial regulatory framework and that of State aid are continuing 
attempts to ensure the stability of, promote competition in, and minimize moral hazard to 
both individual financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. The first two 
terms are used widely in everyday life in contexts far removed from the economic sphere 
and are used to describe human traits, motivations and patterns of behavior.10 It is 
however from their significance in economics that all three derive their importance as 
primary concerns of financial regulation and State aid law. Perhaps the most fundamental 
intellectual legacy of the banking crisis of 2008 has been to turn the discipline of 
economics itself inside out as many of the assumptions it has made about the functioning 
of markets have been challenged. As the former UK financial regulator Lord Turner 
commented in his review of the regulatory response to the crisis: ‘[It] raises important 
questions about the intellectual assumptions on which previous regulatory approaches 
                                                            
9  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes (Princeton University Press 2013) 
Chapter 12; Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency and the Coming of Capitalism (Oxford University 
Press 2014), Chapter 8. 
10  Even the term “moral hazard” (hardly the stuff of everyday speech) has entered into popular culture. 
In the 2010 Wall Street movie on the banking crisis, the character played by Michael Douglas responds to a 
question from a member of the public by saying that: ‘Moral hazard is when they take your money and then 
are not responsible for what they do with it’. 
  
have largely been built. At the core of these assumptions has been the theory of efficient 
and rational markets.’11 
Now we know that financial market innovation in the development of highly 
structured securitized credit products did not always diffuse and allocate risk so as to 
produce a stable equilibrium in financial markets.12 The very opposite was often the case 
as an unhealthy degree of concentration and interlinkage arose between systemically 
important banks and these products were found on (or all too often off but nonetheless 
ultimately toxic to) the balance sheets and liquidity positions of many other banks too. 
The methodology of risk assessment employed in the valuation models around which 
much of this securitization activity that fuelled competition between banks (and indeed 
between financial centers), was itself tainted by “model risk” and therefore of little help to 
regulators and banks in predicting, preparing for and withstanding the ongoing extreme 
shocks that afflicted the banking system in 2008.13 The combined effect of these two 
factors coupled with cyclical changes in market conditions resulted in a perfect storm of 
                                                            
11  ‘The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis ’ [2009] March FSA (Turner 
Review), para 1.4.  
12  Even the IMF claimed that debt securitization would bring about greater stability: ‘[T]he dispersion 
of credit risk by banks to a broader and more diverse set of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on 
their balance sheets, has helped make the banking and overall financial system more resilient’ (IMF Global 
Financial Stability Report April 2006). 
13  Paragraph 1.4(iii) of the Turner Review summarizes four distinct failings of the basic risk Value at 
Risk (VaR) assessment model which, along with more sophisticated variants, lies at the heart of the banking 
industry’s – and its regulators’ – pre-crisis view of financial risk. Extensive literature exists around that critique 
and continues to develop around the problem, with too much trust being placed in financial models: e.g. Kevin 
Dowd, ‘Beyond Value at Risk: The New Science of Risk Management’ (Wiley 1998); Jón Daníelsson, ‘The 
Emperor Has No Clothes: Limits to Risk Modelling’ [2002] 26 Journal of Banking and Finance 4, 1273; 
Christophe M. Boucher, Jón Daníelsson, Patrick S. Kouontchou, Bertrand B. Maillet, ‘Risk Models-at-Risk’ 
[2014] Journal of Banking and Finance 44, 72. 
  
financial instability which occurred as soon as sentiment in inter-bank lending and 
property markets changed. 
 
d) Why banks are special 
 
There is an inherent fragility at the heart of all banking activity. This is a consequence of 
the maturity mismatch that is the essence of financial intermediation whereby short-term 
deposit liabilities are converted into long-term credit assets. This special characteristic is 
used to justify the regulation of banks in the first place.14 Diamond and Dybvig have 
highlighted the role of regulation as a response to the inevitable susceptibility to runs and 
panics that necessarily accompanies the business model of all banks.15 But competition 
within the single market, in contrast to financial stability, was a longstanding European 
policy goal enshrined in the founding treaties and accompanied by an impressive array of 
hard powers of intervention, in relation to anti-competitive agreements, abuse of 
dominance, merger and State aid control, to be operated by the European Union.16 When 
competition is combined with the inherent fragility of the banking sector’s business 
model, the potential for instability and bank runs is increased.17 The existence of deposit 
                                                            
14  A useful discussion of this aspect of the case for banking regulation along with a summary of 
literature on the point is provided in Chapter 1 (Goodhart et al. 1998), at 10-12. 
15  Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’ [1983] 
Journal of Political Economy 91, at 401, 403. 
16  While Regulation 1/2003 has introduced decentralized enforcement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU, the 
European Commission retains a monopoly over the enforcement of the State aid provisions set out in Articles 
108-9 TFEU.  
17  Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Liberalization, Moral Hazard in 
Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?’ [2001] American Economic Review, 
147. 
  
insurance schemes guaranteeing repayment of certain categories of bank deposits in the 
event of default is a widespread policy response to this in-built tendency towards 
instability.18 The ultimate global standard setter for financial regulation of banks, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, considers depositor protection a key element in 
guarding against financial instability although it does not make such a scheme an actual 
requirement in the most recent version of its Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision.19 Despite their growing ubiquity it has been argued that the existence of such 
schemes can lead to adverse incentives and moral hazard.20 The knowledge that the 
scheme will provide a safety net can incentivize the kinds of risk-taking and imprudent 
behavior that they were designed to guard against21 as well as diminish the importance of 
due diligence on the part of the depositor when it comes to determining bank safety and 
soundness.22 Indeed insurance is often used as the textbook illustration of an 
                                                            
18  A comprehensive bibliography of literature on deposit insurance schemes spanning their first 
inception in the 1930s to recent post-crisis reforms is provided by the International Association of Deposit 
Insurers (IAIDS) at <http://www.iadi.org/Publications.aspx?id=52> accessed 18 April 2016.  
19  Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm accessed 15 April 
2016> accessed 12 May 2016, para. 52. 
20  The arguments around this are succinctly rehearsed by the EFTA Court in its January 2013 judgment 
in Case E-16/11 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland, 28 January 2013. 
21  As recently recognized by Advocate General Mengozzi in his opinion in Case C‑127/14 Andrejs 
Surmačs v Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija [2015] ECR I-000, 49-50, in his consideration of whether a 
Latvian national law could exclude the deposits of employees responsible for supervision, strategy and 
planning of a bank’s business from the coverage of its domestic legislation which implemented the previously 
applicable Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit guarantee 
schemes [2004] OJ L135/5.  
22  For a useful review of the argument on this point in both the US and European contexts, see Richard 
S. Grossman, ‘Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 
  
arrangement that is fraught with moral hazard.23 Other instances of moral hazard creating 
market interventions in financial markets are said to include IMF support to sovereigns,24 
the availability and exercise of central bank lender of last resort assistance to banks,25 
loosening of monetary policy to support asset prices,26 and of course the tax payer funded 
bail-outs and rescues across Europe’s banking sector that went far beyond the external 
support provided by the deposit insurance schemes that existed pre-crisis and were 
extended during it.27 Noss and Sowerbutts identify this latter implicit subsidy to banks as 
weakening market discipline as well as a source of competitive advantage to those banks 
that received it and are perceived as within its ambit in future.28 The extent to which such 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1930s’ [1992] The American Economic Review 82, 800; and Nikoletta Kleftouri, ‘Deposit Insurance Systems 
and Moral Hazard’ [2013] JIBLR 28, 271. 
23  Mark V. Pauly, ‘The Economics of Moral Hazard’ [1968] American Economic Review 58, 531. 
24  Andrew G. Haldane and Jörg Scheibe, ‘IMF Lending and Creditor Moral Hazard’ Bank of England 
Working Paper No. 216 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=598905> accessed 18 April 2016. 
25  Xavier Freixas, ‘Optimal Bail Out Policy, Conditionality and Constructive Ambiguity’ (1999) Centre for 
Economic Policy Research Working Paper No. 400 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=199054> accessed 18 April 2016. 
26  Gianni De Nicolò, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, ‘Monetary Policy and Bank 
Risk Taking’ (1 July 2010), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654582> accessed 18 April 2016. The potential for 
moral hazard arising in the European System for Central Banks (ECSB) Outright Monetary Transactions 
program was recognized by Advocate General Villalón in his opinion delivered on 14 January 2015 in Case 
C‑62/14 Peter Gauweiler et al v Deutscher Bundestag [2015] ECR I-000. 
27  Kevin Dowd, ‘Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis’ [2009] Cato J. 29, 141; Angelos A. Antzoulato 
and Chris Tsoumas, ‘Institutions, Moral Hazard and Expected Government Support of Banks’ [2014] Journal of 
Financial Stability 15, 161. This point about the public rescues and recapitalizations of Europe’s banks was 
recognized by the General Court in Case T-319/11 ABN Amro Group NV v European Commission [2014] ECR I-
000. 
28  Joseph Noss and Rhiannon Sowerbutts, ‘The Implicit Subsidy of Banks’ (Bank of England Financial 
Stability Paper 15, 2012). 
  
moral hazard is real or exaggerated is a contestable question,29 but there can be no doubt 
that the overall picture that emerges is of a tangled web of interrelationships between 
competition, financial stability and moral hazard. 
 
e) Financial instability in the internal market 
 
Historic evidence abounds that episodes of financial instability afflicting individual banks 
and sometimes entire regional or country banking systems are nothing new30  and legal 
history shows us that a period of legislative and renewed regulatory reform and activity 
follows in the wake of such tipping points.31 However, this has been the first episode of 
financial instability that has beset banks operating across the European Union’s internal 
market. Thus, member state governments could look to historical precedent for ways to 
curb banking panics and runs and protect depositor funds held in banks operating within 
their borders and, importantly, had, through their finance ministries and national 
regulatory authorities the legal wherewithal to do so, at least in the very short term.32 
But the European Union had no such advantages, despite its elaborate pre-crisis 
architecture of expert advisory committees tasked with ensuring an equivalent and 
appropriate implementation of the single market legislation for banking and other 
                                                            
29  Lawrence Summers, ‘Beware Moral Hazard Fundamentalists’ Financial Times (23 September 2007). 
30  Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(Princeton University Press 2012). 
31  Matthew Hollow, Folarin Akinbami and Ranald Michie (eds) Complexity and Crisis in the Financial 
System: Critical Perspectives on American and British Banking (Edward Elgar 2016).  
32  In the case of member states in the Eurozone, the costs of State guarantees and transfers to the 
sovereign’s balance sheet employed to stabilize banks fed into the continuing crises in sovereign debt markets 
in some Eurozone States and to the need for bail-outs and emergency lending programs to the sovereign 
government itself.  
  
financial services. None of these bodies had the kind of legal competence that could 
override action taken by member state authorities or set aside the operation of national 
insolvency laws. The European Union was left powerless to intervene  to order steps be 
taken by cross-border banks  and the member states in which they conducted operations  
to co-ordinate action and thus  prevent measures taken by one member state to reassure 
local depositors from having spillover destabilizing effects in other member states. As a 
consequence, capital hemorrhaged across borders from the banking systems of crisis-hit 
member states into whichever member state that had the most generous government 
guarantees to depositors at the time. The European Union thus learned the hard way that 
the former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King’s description of some large financial 
groups as ‘international in life if not in death’ is equally applicable to the cross-border 
operations of European banks within the single market.33 
How then would the need to promote competition and protect competitiveness 
of banks sit alongside the need to reverse the negative sentiment surrounding their safety 
and soundness that imperiled their very existence? For competition and stability are often 
seen as oppositional values – too much of one can endanger the other. Where to set the 
balance point between the two is a hard and complex policy choice. It is a choice that 
inevitably will vary over time and the economic and political cycle as general awareness 
and interest in the need for competition and competitiveness within an industry or sector 
on the one hand, as opposed to the need for stability within it, waxes and wanes 
depending on the immediacy of societal and political concerns. There is no reason to 
                                                            
33  Mervyn King, ‘Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and Back Again’ (Second Bagehot Lecture, 
Buttonwood Gathering, New York City on Monday 25 October 2010) 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2010/speech455.pdf> 
accessed 18 April 2016. 
  
suppose that it does not also vary across countries, cultures34 and industry sectors in the 
same way as it does from person to person when we think of “competitiveness” and 
“stability” as individual human characteristics. In societies in turmoil we seek stability first 
and foremost. For those in atrophy and decay we seek the return of growth and renewal 
of enterprise profitability through a release of energy and spirit from greater 
competitiveness.  
There is extensive scholarly discussion of the competition versus financial stability 
dichotomy in the academic literature in financial economics.35 But as to how to judge the 
                                                            
34  An illustrative example of the differences within the internal market itself is the very different 
position taken by the UK to that taken by the European Parliament and the Council as to the validity of the 
powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to intervene in short selling activities 
conferred by Article 28 of Regulation 236/2012. These differences reveal a fundamental philosophical 
distinction between the two sides regarding the nature of financial stability (and hence amenability to the use 
of objective decision making criteria). The UK unsuccessfully argued that the regulation conferred too wide 
and subjective a discretion upon the ESMA to intervene in matters which were the proper province of 
economic policy and required more nuanced and careful judgment in each and every case. As the Court itself 
put it in its judgment description of the UK’s view of ESMA judgments about financial stability:  
 
[S]uch decisions will require an analysis of the significant economic policy implications, such as the 
impact on liquidity and the level of uncertainty that will be created in financial markets, which, in 
turn, have long-term consequences as to general overall confidence in the markets. These are 
‘unquantifiable […] judgments’ and cannot be categorized as decisions made on the basis of set 
criteria amenable to objective review. 
 
 Case C-270/12 UK v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2014] OJ C85/4, 31 (UK v 
European Parliament and Council 2014). 
35  Allen and Gale consider the nature of the optimal trade-off between competition and stability in 
banking and posit that ‘[g]reater competition may be good for (static) efficiency, but bad for financial stability’. 
See Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, ‘Competition and Financial Stability’ [2004] Journal of Money, Credit, and 
  
interrelationship between the two goals, or where the optimal balance might lie, no clear 
consensus emerges which could be of general application in practical decision making for 
every instance of banking distress. Unlike economists, those tasked with legal authority 
are often faced with concrete immediate questions as to whether and how to exercise 
their powers. The sources of and cures for bank distress can vary so widely that universal 
rules are unhelpful. As such it was left to the European Commission, through the use of its 
ability to police the distribution of State aid in the banking sector, to make that difficult 
policy choice between competition and stability on a case by case basis in an environment 
where the caseload assumed an urgency and scale that had not been previously 
envisaged. It had certainly not experienced such a systemic disturbance in any other 
industry or sector in which it had developed its State aid policy. The way in which it used 
those powers and could do so again in the next episode of financial instability (for there 
will surely be one) is the subject of enquiry in many of the essays contained in this work. 
 
2.  Rubber-stamping or mission creep? An assessment of the State aid regime 
during the financial crisis  
 
The Commission’s handling of the State aid dimension of the financial crisis has attracted 
praise for its efficiency in addressing an exponential increase in case load, and for its 
flexibility in adapting policy and practice to reflect the systemic nature of the crisis. The 
speed and flexibility of this response however and the near universal approval of State aid 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Banking 36, 40; Elena Carletti and Philipp Hartmann, ‘Competition and Financial Stability: What’s Special About 
Banking?’ in Paul Mizen (ed), Monetary History, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets: Essays in Honour of 
Charles Goodhart (Edward Elgar 2002, Vol. 2); ECB Working Paper No 146/2002; Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihak 
and Simon Wolfe, ‘Are Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?’ [2009] Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 41, 711; Xavier Vives, ‘Competition and Stability in Banking’ (1 April 2010). IESE Business School 
Working Paper No. 852 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593613> accessed 18 April 2016. 
  
measures during this period, also gave rise to the claim that, rather than keeping State aid 
at bay, the Commission’s efforts were simply directed towards providing national 
interventions with a patina of legal respectability.36 Concerns were also raised about the 
Commission’s tendency to act as surrogate financial regulator. Such concerns over 
“mission creep” were fed by statements emanating from the Commission itself: in the 
early stages of the financial crisis, Neelie Kroes (then Commissioner for Competition 
Policy) appeared to endorse the view that the Commission was ‘doing the work that 
banking regulators should be doing’, and at a later stage, her successor in the role added 
that this institution had de facto become a  ‘central crisis management and resolution 
authority’.37  
On closer inspection, the claim that the Commission exercised excessive 
forbearance towards national bailout measures seems to be based on a narrow view of 
the purpose of State aid control, a view that sees the role of State aid law as preventing 
any form of State intervention that distorts competition. Yet, the high rate of positive (i.e. 
approval) decisions in the area of State aid is a function of the Commission’s power to 
channel State intervention towards predefined common objectives and to shape 
                                                            
36  On rare occasions, the Commission has found a national aid measure to be incompatible with the 
internal market. See Commission Decision 2011/346/EU on the State aid C 33/09 implemented by Portugal in 
the form of a State guarantee to Banco Privado Português [2011] OJ L159/95; Commission Decision on State 
aid SA.33927 (12/C) implemented by Belgium — Guarantee scheme protecting the shares of individual 
members of financial cooperatives [2014] OJ L284/53; Commission Decision of 23 December 2015 on the State 
aid SA.39451 (2015/C) implemented by Italy for Banca Tercas (not yet published). 
37  Respectively, Neelie Kroes, ‘The Crisis and Beyond: For a Stronger, Cleaner, Fairer Economy’ (OECD 
Forum, 23 June 2009 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-306_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 12 
May 2016; and Joaquín Almunia, ‘Banks in Distress and Europe’s Competition Regime: On the Road to the 
Banking Union’ (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 25 September 2013 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-750_en.htm> accessed 16 May 2016). 
  
individual State aid measures. This power is exercised ex ante, by fleshing out the 
common objectives outlined in Articles 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU, and through Commission 
guidelines and communications. But the power is also exercised ex post via highly detailed 
conditions set forth in State aid decisions themselves.  Thus, the value of the State aid 
regime does not simply lie in preventing unwarranted intervention but also in establishing 
a common approach to State intervention. 
A certain level of public intervention is a common feature among all advanced 
economic systems, where it is used to address genuine market failures, or as a strategic 
trade policy tool, or even as a short-term tactic in the pursuit of electoral gain.38 However, 
State intervention has the potential to unravel market integration and reintroduce 
barriers to trade, for even State intervention that pursues genuine policy concerns may 
create cross-border externalities and lock member states into a prisoner’s dilemma 
scenario, in which the lack of credible mutual commitment leads to a harmful (and 
wasteful) subsidy war. The existence of central coordination is intended to prevent this 
scenario from arising. Indeed this was (arguably) the Commission’s most valuable 
contribution to the management of the financial crisis. Had the Commission indulged in 
forbearance, it is most likely that a full-scale subsidy war would have emerged. One need 
only consider the panic initially triggered in September 2008 by the announcement of the 
Irish government that it would guarantee all (retail, commercial, institutional and 
interbank) deposits, covered bonds, senior debt and dated subordinated debt of Irish 
banks.39 By the same token, had the Commission adopted a rigid interpretation of the 
                                                            
38  Timothy Besley and Paul Seabright, ‘The Effects and Policy Implications of State Aids to Industry: An 
Economic Analysis’ [1999] 34 Economic Policy 13; Mathias Dewatripont and Paul Seabright, ‘Wasteful Public 
Spending and State Aid Control’ [2010] Journal of the European Economic Association 4, 513. 
39  Commission Decision on State aid NN48/2008 Ireland – Guarantee scheme for banks in Ireland 
[2008] OJ C312/1. 
  
rules, it is likely that member states would have resorted to Article 108(2) TFEU (which 
gives the Council power to override a Commission State aid decision) — an avenue that 
would have led to undermining the normative authority of State aid control.  
 If the ”rubber-stamping” claim can easily be dismissed, the claim that State aid 
control overstepped into the domain of financial regulation deserves to be explored in 
greater depth, as it points to a feature that is both a strength and a weakness of this 
regulatory regime. The State aid regime’s openness to a wide range of policy concerns 
enables the peculiarities of the regulatory domains with which State aid policy interacts to 
be taken into account, but also allows State aid policy to adapt to fundamental 
developments in the economy and to reflect the evolution of societal priorities. In order to 
be able to interact with other policy domains, however, State aid often needs to 
internalize concepts, interests and values that are not part of the intellectual apparatus of 
competition law. This openness presents two fundamental challenges. First, the contours 
of the external concepts that the Commission is required to integrate may elude precise 
definition and predictable application. Second, despite talk of reconciling different 
objectives, the outcome of such a balancing process is never neutral, as trade-offs are 
inevitably made. This openness to other regulatory concerns is central to capturing the 
Commission’s State aid policy and decision making practice during the financial crisis. In 
particular the interaction between, on the one hand, typical State aid concerns such as the 
prevention of distortions of competition and, on the other, the containment of systemic 
risk and moral hazard, allows us to make sense of State aid policy during this turbulent 
period. This particular interaction was unprecedented in scope and intensity, but not 
entirely novel. A brief excursion into pre-crisis State aid practice helps to understand the 




a) Competition, stability and moral hazard in pre-crisis State aid practice 
 
References to moral hazard in State aid policy and practice pre-date the crisis. Indeed the 
soft budget constraint syndrome, a concept cognate to moral hazard, throws light on 
some fundamental legal principles of State aid law, which address both the threshold 
question, that is, whether there is State aid in the first place, and the compatibility 
question, that is, whether State aid can be authorized. The central insight of the soft 
budget constraint theory is that the expectation that a supporting organization (typically, 
the State) will regularly intervene to shield an economic actor from insolvency affects the 
latter’s behavior. A firm that enjoys a soft budget constraint, safe in the knowledge that 
State assistance will always be forthcoming, is able to either pursue a quiet life or, on the 
contrary, to take excessive risks. According to the theory, two conditions give rise to the 
soft budget constraint syndrome: first, the possibility for the beneficiary to renegotiate ex 
post the terms of its funding and, second, a close relationship between the State and the 
beneficiary of its support. As Kornai, Maskin and Roland remark:40 
 
[…] the syndrome is truly at work only if organizations can expect to be rescued 
from trouble, and those expectations in turn affect their behavior. Such 
expectations have much to do with collective experience. The more frequently 
financial problems elicit support in some part of the economy, the more 
                                                            
40  János Kornai, ‘The Soft Budget Constraint’ [1986] 39 Kyklos 3. The theory has been hugely influential 
and has given rise to a number of different applications. While its original formulation pertained to socialist 
economies, the theory has been applied to market economies as well. For an application of the theory to State 
aid, see Isabela Atanasiu, ‘State Aid in Central and Eastern Europe’ [2001] World Competition 24, 257; and 
Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller and Vincent Verouden, ‘European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework’, in Paolo Buccirossi (ed) Handbook of Antitrust Economics (MIT Press 2007). 
  
organizations in that part of the economy will count on getting support 
themselves. 41  
 
As far as the threshold question (of whether a State measure constitutes State aid) is 
concerned, the market operator principle asks whether the State measure confers an 
advantage on its recipient. The principle turns on the comparison between the behavior of 
the State and that of a hypothetical market operator. The purpose of its application is not 
to prevent State intervention in the economy, but to inject accountability into the 
relationship between the State and the market. State aid law seeks to harden the budget 
constraint of market actors and turn the relationship between State and market actors 
into an arm’s length one.  
 The objective of preventing the soft budget constraint syndrome may also be seen 
at play at the compatibility stage, more specifically, in the context of the assessment of aid 
aimed at rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. Given the distortionary potential of 
rescuing firms in financial distress, the guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid require 
that such aid be a one-off intervention.42 The “one time last time” principle is justified ‘[i]n 
order to reduce moral hazard, excessive risk-taking incentives and potential competitive 
distortions’.43 In keeping with the theory of the soft-budget constraint, which holds that a 
condition that allows this syndrome to emerge is the ability of the beneficiary to 
renegotiate ex post the terms of its funding, the guidelines go on to explain that ‘repeated 
State interventions are likely to lead to problems of moral hazard and distortions of 
                                                            
41  János Kornai, Eric Maskin and Gérard Roland, ‘Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint’ [2003] 
Journal of Economic Literature 41, 1095. 
42  Commission Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in 
difficulty [2014] OJ C249/1. 
43  Ibid., at 70. 
  
competition that are contrary to the common interest’. Consequently, aid may be granted 
only once over a period of ten years.  
Yet, when aid is granted in the context of bank rescue operations, questions of 
moral hazard become more complicated, not only because the (often incestuous) 
relationship between governments and banks makes fertile ground for the soft budget 
constraint syndrome to emerge, but also because moral hazard concerns typically need to 
be balanced against concerns over the stability of the banking system. This was already 
clear in the Crédit Lyonnais decisions, which offered a preview of some the issues that 
would come to dominate the Commission’s State aid practice a decade later.44 In the 
1990s, Crédit Lyonnais (CL) was the largest bank in Europe and one of the largest in the 
world.45 CL had suffered catastrophic losses caused by a combination of factors, including 
spectacularly irresponsible lending decisions, regulatory capture, outright fraud, and the 
bursting of a real estate bubble. State aid came into question when the French 
government stepped in to prevent the bank’s insolvency. Although CL’s problems were 
not associated with a systemic banking crisis, but were a result of specific issues affecting 
the bank itself, at the same time, its size and international reach, and its potential to 
spread contagion to the banking system warranted careful handling. To this end, the 
Commission consulted a group of ”wise men” made up of former central bank governors 
on the specific issues of the case and on the risks to stability deriving from the potential 
failure of a large systemic bank. Their advice was that there was no reason to dispense 
with the ordinary State aid rules, provided that account was taken of the potential impact 
                                                            
44  Commission Decision giving conditional approval to the aid granted by France to the bank Crédit 
Lyonnais [1995] OJ L308/92; Commission Decision concerning aid granted by France to the Crédit Lyonnais 
group [1998] OJ L221/28 (1998 Decision). 
45  The vernacular of financial regulation would today describe the bank as a “SIFI” (Systemically 
Important Financial Institution). 
  
of the decision on the financial system. As a result the Commission set out with the 
intention of following the rescue and restructuring guidelines, and the “one time last 
time” principle enshrined therein. Yet after the first State aid decision the considerable 
worsening of CL’s financial situation prompted the French government to step in to 
support the bank for a second time. While the second round of State aid was eventually 
authorized, thus derogating from the “one time last time” principle, the Commission 
imposed radical restructuring as a condition for its approval.46 
Crédit Lyonnais seems an apt demonstration of the salience of the soft budget 
constraint syndrome to State aid law in the banking sector. At the time, the French 
banking sector was characterized by a high level of public ownership, and by a close 
administrative relationship between the State and the management of the banks. As the 
Commission remarked, the relationship between the government and the banks was one 
that involved an expectation of ‘quasi-systematic state support’ for public banks in 
difficulty. These arrangements had made ‘a lasting contribution to the imprudent conduct 
of the managers of French nationalized banks’, which had relied on their shareholder (the 
State) for virtually automatic support.47 The Commission concluded that ‘any lasting 
solution for CL and the nationalized banking system in France must entail a reform of the 
corporate governance of the group and its institutions and a solution to the moral hazard 
problem engendered by the State's ultimate willingness to provide support […] ’. 48  
  
b) Competition and stability in a systemic crisis 
                                                            
46  Commission Decision giving conditional approval to the aid granted by France to the bank Crédit 
Lyonnais [1995] OJ L308/92; Commission Decision concerning aid granted by France to the Crédit Lyonnais 
group [1998] OJ L221/28 (1998 Decision).  
47  1998 Decision, at 10.2. 
48  Ibid. 
  
 
There are some similarities between the Crédit Lyonnais decision and the cases that 
emerged during the financial crisis, such as the difficulty in crystallizing the full extent of 
the bank’s losses, or the invocation of the “too big to fail” argument. The Commission’s 
response to the latter argument in Crédit Lyonnais, however, captures a fundamental 
difference between the isolated crisis developed around the French bank and the systemic 
crisis caused, in the following decade, by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In Crédit 
Lyonnais, the Commission emphasized that the bailout could easily have been avoided if a 
combination of depositor protection and an orderly resolution mechanism had been 
introduced. With the latter framework in place, the bank would have been wound down 
without running the risk of triggering a systemic crisis and without inflicting a significant 
outlay of funds on French taxpayers. It was clear, from the Commission’s point of view, 
that CL’s crisis was idiosyncratic and not systemic in nature. 
 The situation that emerged during the financial crisis turned out to be far more 
complex, not only because of the (continuing) absence of a legislative framework for 
orderly resolution, and the greater degree of integration of the European banking system 
but, crucially, because by October 2008 the crisis had developed into a fully-fledged 
systemic crisis. If at the end of 2007, in its first Northern Rock decision, the Commission 
could still rely on the Crédit Lyonnais precedent, and reject the existence of a systemic 
crisis by pointing to the idiosyncratic risk yielded by the British bank’s extreme business 
model, a year later the problems faced by European banks were no longer considered to 
be confined to some reckless outliers but were symptoms of a deeper malaise threatening 
the banking system and the wider economy. 49  
                                                            
49  Commission Decision on State aid NN 70/2007 Rescue Aid to Northern Rock [2008] OJ C43/1. The 
second Northern Rock decision was handed down in 2009, at which point the State aid was considered in the 
context of the systemic crisis. Commission Decision on State aid C 14/2008 Northern Rock [2010] OJ L112/38. 
  
The recognition of the systemic nature of the crisis (from October 2008) caused a 
shift in State aid policy as the Commission, prompted by the European Council’s call for 
‘speedy and flexible action’ in State aid control, began to rely consistently on Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU, a provision that had remained dormant for decades.50 Its wording, which 
refers to ‘aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’, opened 
up the possibility of adapting the existing rules to reflect the urgency and scale of the 
response by member states. Thus, the “one-time last-time” principle was set aside, the 
range of tools that could be used to rescue banks was extended beyond loans and 
guarantees to include recapitalization and impaired asset measures, and the duration of 
the rescue measures was extended beyond six months.51  
However, there was a certain level of ambiguity in the flexibility of Article 
107(3)(b). While it was clear that this flexibility was justified for as long as the crisis 
remained a systemic one, it was not as clear whether this provision applied only to banks 
of systemic relevance or whether all other banks would also be covered. One approach 
that the Commission could have taken, but did not, would have been to regard only 
institutions of significant size as having systemic importance, so that only “too big to fail” 
                                                            
50  European Council of 15 and 16 October 2008, Presidency Conclusions (Doc 14368/08), 5. The fact 
that Article 107(3)(b) TFEU could be deployed to address a systemic banking crisis was already well 
understood at the time of the Crédit Lyonnais decision: see the panel discussion and the papers in ‘Panel Two’ 
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in the Field of State Aids (Hart Publishing 2001). 
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OJ C270/8 (Banking Communication); Communication from the Commission on the recapitalisation of financial 
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institutions would fall under the umbrella of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. In the United States, 
where an orderly resolution regime had been in place for decades, the Federal 
Government’s was able to focus its rescue efforts on all (except one) large, systemically 
important, financial institutions, while hundreds of small banks went into orderly 
resolution.52 In the absence of an equivalent regulatory regime, this approach had little 
chance of a successful transplant into Europe. Here, not only did the level of cross-border 
exposure and interdependence between banks blur the line between systemically 
important institutions and other banks, but a strict approach to systemic risk was certain 
to fail to command the support of the member states, an essential factor in securing 
effective implementation of any Commission State aid decision, let alone decisions taken 
during a period of global turmoil. Given this context, the Commission’s failure to question 
the systemic relevance of even small, regional banks, and its willingness to treat each bank 
as systemically relevant, appears to have been a necessary upshot of the circumstances 
rather than a policy choice that was explicitly articulated.  
 
c) Moral hazard in a systemic crisis 
 
The moral hazard aspects of Crédit Lyonnais were relatively straightforward. Once the 
bank was radically restructured, and the links between its management and the 
government were severed, the soft budget constraint was less likely to re-emerge. 
Although the greater ease with which the risk of contagion can be contained in an 
idiosyncratic crisis gives the Commission greater room to maneuver than in a systemic 
                                                            
52  In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which was created in 1933 to 
administer a system of depositor protection, has the power to act as receiver for failed banks. That is not to 
say that all banks that benefited from the TARP Capital Purchase Program were systemically important. A 
number of smaller (solvent) institutions also received capital injections. 
  
crisis, in which the challenge lies both in taking account of the differences between each 
affected bank, but also in taking account of the similarities between different banks. 
Granted a number of financial crisis cases involved bloated institutions that had expanded 
their balance sheet through exuberant acquisitions, and involved State-controlled banks 
whose problems replicated aspects of Crédit Lyonnais; however, often banks were also 
struck because of their sheer homogeneity. Where a high number of interrelated banks 
are affected, often the issues of individual banks cannot be isolated from those affecting 
similar banks, for the source of risk does not simply lie in the past behavior of an individual 
bank, but in the interaction between that bank’s past behavior and that of numerous 
other banks. This scenario, known in the literature as the “too many to fail” phenomenon, 
occurs where banks cluster around the same source of risk (e.g. excessive reliance on 
short-term wholesale funding) and as a consequence are affected by the same shocks. In 
this situation, governments choose to rescue even relatively small banks in the knowledge 
that the benefit of avoiding contagion is greater than the cost of bailing out banks that are 
not “too big to fail”. According to the literature on “too many to fail”, the decision to 
rescue smaller banks is itself a source of moral hazard as it creates perverse incentives for 
banks to choose the same risk strategies.53 In this scenario, herding becomes a safety net, 
as homogeneity makes the authorities’ task of disentangling systemically important banks 
from other banks, and the pursuit of targeted bailouts, extremely challenging. 
  If redressing moral hazard, as far as State aid is concerned, with regard to banks 
that have engaged in reckless expansion may take the form of capacity reductions, and 
the soft-budget constraint syndrome in State-owned banks may be prevented for the 
future through changes in their governance structures, it is unclear how State aid policy 
should approach a situation in which banks have become systemic because of their 
                                                            
53  Viral V. Acharya and Tanju Yorulmazer, ‘Too Many to Fail – An Analysis of Time-inconsistency in Bank 
Closure Policies’ [2007] Journal of Financial Intermediation 26, 31 (Archarya and Yorulmazer 2007). 
  
collective behavior. Even if the conditions imposed by the Commission through its 
decisions may well target the common risk that has ultimately led to rescuing these banks 
(for instance, measures to rebalance and diversify funding structures) such conditions, 
together with the other typical remedies imposed as conditions for approval (such as 
burden-sharing, changes to management and limits to compensation), are unable to 
prevent future herding. No matter how far-reaching, the restructuring imposed by State 
aid decisions will never be able to prevent the moral hazard associated with this 
phenomenon. 
 
d) Collective moral hazard and sovereign debt 
 
Attempting to isolate moral hazard where risk-taking has taken a collective dimension is 
an exercise fraught with difficulty, a fact that became clear when the Commission was 
forced to confront the State aid implications of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
Although governments were slow to acknowledge the impact of the so-called “doom 
loop” or “deadly embrace” between banks and their sovereigns, eventually consensus 
began to crystallize around the idea that banks should build up a capital buffer against the 
risks associated with their sovereign debt exposures. In 2011 the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) carried out its “EU Capital Exercise” the purpose of which was to establish 
whether banks held sufficient capital against their holdings of sovereign debt and to 
require banks to improve their capital positions accordingly. This in turn prompted the 
Commission to recalibrate its State aid assessment of recapitalizations. While previously, it 
had been Commission policy to require any bank that received a capital injection to 
undergo restructuring, from 2012 banks that were being recapitalized as a result of the EU 
Capital Exercise were subject to a proportionate assessment. This meant that financial 
institutions could benefit from a complete or partial exemption from restructuring, 
  
provided that three cumulative conditions were met: a) the capital shortfall was linked to 
a crisis of confidence in the sovereign debt market; b) the capital injection was limited to 
the amount necessary to offset losses stemming from marking sovereign bonds to market 
in banks that were otherwise viable; and c) the sovereign debt portfolio had not been 
acquired as a result of excessive risk-taking. 54  
With the last condition for proportionate assessment, the Commission set itself a 
particularly challenging task. Had it chosen to stigmatize collective moral hazard, it would 
have treated the banks’ common predilection for sovereign debt as both a source and a 
product of moral hazard. Indeed, the vicious cycle that fed the sovereign debt crisis, the 
bank-sovereign “doom loop”, is regarded in the literature as a distinct example of 
collective moral hazard, an instance of the “too many to fail” phenomenon.55 As has been 
widely documented, not only did banks simultaneously increase their holdings of 
government bonds, but their purchases clustered around domestic government bonds at 
a time when the risk of sovereign default was perceived to be at its highest level.56 From 
this perspective, the behavior of banks, especially banks of the Eurozone periphery, would 
appear to amount to excessive risk-taking.  
Yet, compelling as the collective moral hazard view may be, it does not readily 
translate into practice, at least not as far as State aid policy is concerned, as a number of 
competing considerations come to the fore. First, at which point in time does purchasing 
                                                            
54  Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2011] OJ C356/7 [14] [emphasis 
added]. 
55  See E. Farhi and J. Tirole, ‘Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops’ 
(CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11024 December 2015 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2714264> accessed 18 April 
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56  Viral V. Acharya and Sascha Steffen, ‘The “Greatest” Carry Trade Ever? Understanding Eurozone 
Bank Risks’ [2015] Journal of Financial Economics 115, 215. 
  
government bonds become risky? The answer is not straightforward because market-
based assessments of sovereign risk, which banks rely on, are notoriously deficient. For 
instance, for the entire 2000-08 period, the spreads on ten-year government bonds of all 
Eurozone member states were close to zero meaning that the bond markets regarded the 
risk of default of Eurozone governments as virtually non-existent.57 The risk associated 
with holding bonds of Eurozone periphery governments was only recognized as excessive 
by the markets once the Eurozone crisis had erupted. Importantly, capital adequacy 
regulations incentivized the accumulation of government bonds, as the latter attracted a 
low or zero risk weight (depending on the credit rating associated with the respective 
sovereign debt instrument).58 Last but not least, during this period the Long Term 
Refinancing Operations (LTRO) of the European Central Bank (ECB), which permitted 
banks to pledge sovereign bonds as collateral for central bank liquidity, came to be 
perceived by banks, especially those of the Eurozone periphery, as an incentive to 
increase their exposure to government bonds.59   
                                                            
57  Paul de Grauwe and Yuemei Ji, ‘Mispricing of Sovereign Risk and Macroeconomic Stability in the 
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In light of these complexities it is not surprising that, when faced with the task of 
applying its own criteria for the proportionate assessment of recapitalizations, the 
Commission seemed to tread carefully around the domestic sovereign debt problem, and 
was reluctant to associate excessive risk-taking with the collective accumulation of 
domestic government bonds. The test that the Commission applied in these cases was 
whether an individual bank had displayed an attitude to risk that was comparable to the 
average bank in a specific Member State. It was a highly context-sensitive approach, which 
eschewed a collective moral hazard approach – if all banks were taking the same risks at a 
particular time in a particular country, according to the Commission, they were not 
engaging in excessive risk taking. For instance, in the BPI decision the bank’s capital needs 
were seen as being linked to a confidence crisis in the sovereign debt of Portugal. 
Although the bank had acquired its sovereign debt (in 2009) through carry trade 
transactions (financed by ECB one-year funding) and while, as the Commission remarked, 
‘such transactions could under certain circumstances be considered above average risk-
taking’, the acquired government bonds represented eligible collateral – at the time, the 
bonds were rated well above investment grade (AA- for Portugal).60 On another occasion, 
in its Eurobank decision, the Commission found that part of the capital needs of the bank 
stemmed from ‘regular exposure’ to the sovereign risk of its domestic country (Greece), 
and that for this reason there was ‘less need for the Bank to address moral hazard issues 
in its restructuring plan than for other aided financial institutions which had accumulated 
excessive risks’.61 However, the proportionate assessment could not be applied to its full 
                                                            
60  Commission Decision on State aid SA.35238 (2013/N) – Portugal – BPI Restructuring [2014] OJ 
C460/1, 61. 
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extent where a bank had displayed higher than average risk-taking. For instance, in 
Piraeus Bank, the Commission found that the Bank’s exposure to the Greek sovereign risk 
was larger than the exposure of some other Greek banks of equivalent size and that not all 
the losses could be attributed to the ‘standard exposure of a financial institution to the 
sovereign risk of its domestic country’.62  
At times however the conditions for the proportionate assessment were stretched 
to such an extent as to appear to undermine the coherence of the test. The MPS case 
seemed to have all the hallmarks of an outlier because of the nature and level of 
recklessness exhibited by the bank’s senior management who, in the run up to the 
Eurozone crisis, had taken a series of ruinous decisions. First, MPS had acquired Banca 
Antonveneta from Banco Santander for a price that appeared to defy rationality. In the 
aftermath of the deal, given the significant difference between the purchase price (€9 
billion) and the valuation of Antonveneta (€6 billion), Santander’s shares soared while 
those of MPS slumped,63 and the purchase resulted in goodwill impairments of 
approximately €5.5 billion. The second disastrous decision was taken between 2008 and 
2009, when MPS entered into a set of parallel transactions with Nomura and Deutsche 
                                                                                                                                                                      
SA.36004 (2013/NN), SA.37965 (2013/N), SA.37966 (2013/N), SA.37967 (2013/N) implemented by Greece for 
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Bank: MPS restructured loss-making derivatives with the two banks while simultaneously 
entering into long-term repo transactions based on long-term Italian government bonds 
(for the total value of €5 billion) with those same counterparties. One set of transactions 
was clearly a quid pro quo for the other; indeed the purpose of these transactions 
appeared to be to conceal losses accrued from previous derivatives trades. This link, which 
was not reported in MPS’s accounts, became clear after the resignation of MPS’s senior 
management, when the new management discovered the original contract. The bank was 
subsequently recapitalized twice: first in 2009, as part of a general scheme (the so-called 
“Tremonti bonds”); and the second time in 2013, as a result of the 2011 EBA’s EU capital 
exercise.  
In its decision on restructuring aid to MPS, the Commission approached the 
proportionate assessment from the premise that the EBA ‘EU capital exercise’ was the 
fundamental reason for MPS’s request for State aid. ‘Without the requirement for a 
sovereign buffer’ it held ‘there would have been no shortfall’.64 And while it conceded that 
if MPS had not acquired the long-term Italian sovereign bonds at the center of the 
controversial deal with Nomura and Deutsche Bank ‘the consequences of the EBA “EU 
capital exercise” would have [been] different in scope’, the bank, it added, would still have 
needed extra capital so as to comply with the EBA’s requirements.65 When the 
Commission then went on to determine if the bank’s sizeable sovereign exposure had 
arisen as a consequence of excessive risk-taking, it decided that MPS acquiring significant 
amounts of government bonds before the outbreak of the sovereign crisis could not in 
principle be considered as excessive risk-taking but added  ‘the status of such a strategy is 
less evident in case of the bonds acquired after 2010’. Nonetheless, given that the Italian 
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65  Ibid.  
  
government had only sought partial application of the proportionate assessment 
approach, and in light of the fact that MPS has undertaken to carry out the burden-sharing 
measures as well as behavioral safeguards and a 25% balance sheet reduction, the 
Commission was satisfied that a partial application of that approach would be sufficient.  
At first sight, the reasoning in the MPS decision appears to be in keeping with 
other decisions on the proportionate assessment. Yet it is questionable whether the 
conclusions reached in relation to the excessive risk-taking test follow from the facts of 
the case. An IMF country report from the same period as the European Commission’s MPS 
Decision clearly states that the bank had entered into the structured transactions in 2008 
and 2009 at a time when it held ‘by far the largest sovereign bond portfolio of all Italian 
banks’.66 Indeed, in 2014, the ECB’s comprehensive assessment confirmed MPS’s 
extraordinary weakness, as the bank had the worst capital shortfall of all the 130 
Eurozone banks that underwent this stress test.67 
It is hard to deny in light of these facts that MPS stood out among Italian banks for 
its level of sovereign exposure both before and during the sovereign debt crisis. It is also 
questionable whether it is at all possible to separate the reckless decisions that brought 
about the bank’s downfall from the prior accumulation of sovereign debt. The literature 
on the so-called “doom loop” holds that undercapitalized Eurozone periphery banks tend 
to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds even (or especially) when the 
sovereign’s probability of default increases. They do so, according to this literature, for a 
number of reasons, including the choice to gamble for resurrection, to remain under-
                                                            
66  Italy: Financial System Stability Assessment (IMF Country Report No. 13/300, 15 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13300.pdf> accessed 18 April 2016. 
67  See <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/comprehensive/html/index.en.html> 
accessed 18 April 2016. Plainly, the level of sovereign debt exposure was part of the explanation for the 
shortfall identified by the ECB, as the scenario included the impact of a hypothetical interest rate rise (which 
would have a negative impact on the value of government bonds). 
  
capitalized and to fund themselves through a carry trade which involves going long on 
high-yield sovereign debt and going short on low-yield debt (or borrowing from the ECB).68 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the accumulation of sovereign bonds was the result 
of the bank’s under-capitalization, nor it is unreasonable to surmise that the lack of 
sufficient capital was, at least in part, the result of the bank’s hubristic acquisition. Even if 
the EBA’s requirement of a sovereign buffer was the proximate cause of the request for 
State aid, the fact that the bank was under-capitalized seemed clear well before the EBA’s 
assessment. While one can understand the Commission’s desire not to single out MPS one 
may also wonder whether, in the Commission’s view, a bank’s large sovereign exposure 
can ever be regarded as a symptom of a peculiarly relaxed attitude to risk.  
 
e) Competing objectives and bailout design 
 
In a speech delivered in 2010, Joaquín Almunia held that the European Commission was 
‘the only jurisdiction in the world’ to have ‘explicitly tackled the moral-hazard issue’.69 
These (somewhat pompous) remarks contained an implicit reference to the design of the 
US Government’s bailout program, the Troubled Asset Relief Fund Program (TARP) which, 
according to a number of observers, lacked safeguards against moral hazard.70 As the dust 
                                                            
68  Niccolò Battistini, Marco Pagano and Saverio Simonelli, ‘Systemic Risk and Home Bias in the Euro 
Area’ (European Economy Economic Papers 494, April 2013). 
69  Joaquín Almunia, ‘State Aid Rules Can Help Europe Exit Crisis’ (European State Aid Law Institute, 10 
June 2010 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-301_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 18 April 
2016). 
70  Trouble Asset Relief Fund created under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. For a critique of TARP, see Joseph Stiglitz, ‘We Aren't Done Yet: Comments on the 
Financial Crisis and Bailout’ [2008] The Economists' Voice 5, 1553; and Pietro Veronesi and Luigi Zingales, 
‘Paulson’s Gift’ [2010] Journal of Financial Economics 97, 339. 
  
settled on TARP, commentators began to hail the program as a success, albeit a deeply 
flawed one. Despite this, TARP is now credited with having contributed to the return to 
normality of lending at both the wholesale and retail levels.71 What is more, the impact of 
the program on US public finances has been more benign than was at first believed.72 
Indeed by August 31, 2015, the US Treasury had recovered $275 billion, that is, $29.9 
billion more than the $245.1 billion originally expended.73 By contrast, in the EU, while 
initial interventions by the member states managed to stabilize the banking system, 
lending to the real economy remained anemic for a protracted period. Furthermore, the 
fiscal impact of bailouts is still being felt across Europe. According to recent European 
Central Bank figures, as far as the Eurozone is concerned, over the period 2008-14 
accumulated gross financial sector assistance amounted to 8% of (Eurozone) GDP (€800 
billion), of which only 3.3% of GDP had been recovered.74 
A comprehensive comparison between the two jurisdictions (the US and the EU) is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is useful to consider some fundamental 
                                                            
71  PL. Posner and D. Fantone, ‘The United States’ Response to the Global Financial Crisis’ in John 
Wanna, Evert A. Lindquist and Jouke de Vries (eds) The Global Financial Crisis and its Budget Impacts in OECD 
Nations: Fiscal Responses and Future Challenges (Edward Elgar 2015), 31-58. Charles W. Calomiris and Urooj 
Khan, ‘An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions’ [2015] Journal of Economic Perspectives 29, 
53 (Calomiris and Khan 2015).  
72  This assessment does not take account of the long-term impact of moral hazard, which is hard (or 
impossible) to predict. 
73  For an assessment of the “intangible” costs of TARP (including moral hazard and corruption in 
administering the program), see Calomiris and Khan 2015. An early example of excessive risk-taking by one of 
the major beneficiaries of TARP is said to have been Citigroup’s decision to lend to Dubai World in December 
2008: see Thorsten Beck, Diane Coyle, Mathias Dewatripont, Xavier Freixas and Paul Seabright, Bailing out the 
Banks: Reconciling Stability and Competition (CEPR 2010), 65. 
74  ECB, ‘The Fiscal Impact of Financial Sector Support during the Crisis’ (ECB Economic Bulletin 2015, 
Issue 6). 
  
differences in bailout design between TARP and the European approaches, as this allows 
to explore how the choices made under State aid policy have shaped member state 
responses to the financial crisis. Of course, any assessment of this type needs to be set 
against the backdrop of immense constitutional and economic differences.75 It is also 
important to note that the European Commission’s input in bailout design is limited by the 
lack of exclusive control over individual State aid measures. Granted, the Commission has 
exclusive power to authorize State aid measures and schemes. However, the fact that the 
Member States fund and administer State aid makes it impractical for the Commission to 
determine the precise detail of every national measure. Consequently, the design of State 
assistance to banks is the result of complex interactions between the Commission, the 
member states and (unofficially), the aid recipients and their competitors. Nonetheless, 
the regulatory framework for bank bailouts is the result of choices that the Commission 
makes between alternative approaches, and different trade-offs between competing 
interests follow from these choices. 
 There are broad similarities in the tools employed to stabilize banks during the 
financial crisis on the two sides of the Atlantic: mainly, recapitalizations, guarantees and 
asset relief measures. However, the European response was characterized by greater 
reluctance on the part of the governments to deploy these tools to their full extent, and 
on the part of banks to rely on them. This may have made crisis management on the 
European side less effective than on the North American side. This is particularly true of 
                                                            
75  The list is potentially very long but, crucially, the EU’s lack of fiscal capacity and the size of European 
banks relative to the economies of their member states, together with the obvious fact that in the EU the 
financial crisis was only the first act of a far lengthier drama, are all features that mark the difference between 
the EU and the US. The fact that European governments pursued radical retrenchment (willy-nilly), while the 
US government enacted demand-side stimulus measures may also need to be taken into account. Plainly, the 
presence of demand is a necessary condition for the success of any policy that aims to rekindle lending to the 
real economy.  
  
bank recapitalizations. In particular, by 2009, while US banks had received 2.6% of GDP in 
capital injections, in the EU the total granted in the same period through such measures 
amounted 1.7% of EU GDP, although by 2014 the total had increased to 3.4%.76 While the 
sovereign debt crisis explains the latter figure,77 the initial cleavage between the two sides 
of the Atlantic is more striking, especially as the 1.7% of EU GDP figure masks significant 
variations in the size of capital injections across the Member States: by 2009, only half of 
the member states had granted aid in the form of capital injections.  
There are a number of concurrent explanations for this state of affairs. These may 
include: complacency, or a “wait and see” approach both on the part of the banks and 
their respective governments, government capture (e.g. pressure to avoid shareholder 
dilution) and, most importantly, the fact that banks were “too big to rescue”, given that 
certain governments lacked the fiscal capacity to recapitalize banks with assets many 
times the size of their national GDP.78 There is however some degree of consensus among 
economists, based on the experience of previous banking crises, that early 
recapitalizations of significant magnitude are key to successful crisis management. Indeed, 
in September 2008, a number of prominent economists urged European leaders to 
recapitalize banks, and to do so at European level.79 The reasons behind the failure to go 
down the road of EU level bank recapitalization have been explored in great depth; yet it 
                                                            
76 Data available from DG COMP’s website 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html#tables> 
accessed 18 April 2016. 
77  This affected member states in and out of the Eurozone, albeit to a different extent. 
78  Daniel Gros and Stefano Micossi, ‘The Beginning of the End Game’ Vox (20 September 2008) 
<http://www.voxeu.org/article/mother-all-bailouts-and-what-it-means-europe> accessed 18 April 2016. 
79  Tito Boeri et al., ‘Open Letter to European leaders on Europe’s Banking Crisis: A Call to Action’ 
<http://www.voxeu.org/article/open-letter-european-leaders-europe-s-banking-crisis-call-action> accessed 18 
April 2016. 
  
is worth asking whether State aid policy that may have inhibited more efficient, timely and 
more uniform recapitalizations at national level.  
The answer to this question is necessarily tentative because it is virtually 
impossible to pinpoint a direct and precise causal relationship between EU State aid policy 
and national choices. Although with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to argue that 
the design of State aid policy on recapitalization was not effective in counteracting the 
inherent aversion of governments and banks towards bold recapitalizations. At first 
glance, the EU approach to recapitalizations appeared to reflect to some extent the line 
taken by the US TARP recapitalization program of allowing both sound and distressed 
banks to benefit from public capital injections. However, in Europe, during the 2008-9 
period, recapitalizations were generally reactive rather than pre-emptive – they were 
predominantly employed as a last ditch attempt to save insolvent banks. This may partially 
have been a result of Commission policy. In the first stage of the crisis (2008-11), the 
Commission’s approach centered around the distinction between fundamentally sound 
and distressed banks, the idea being that distressed banks could only return to long-term 
viability, and avoid calling again on the taxpayer if they underwent restructuring.80 The 
distinction between the two categories turned on the extent of the capital injection 
required: banks that required more than 2% of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) were 
regarded as distressed. Banks that crossed that threshold would have to submit a 
restructuring plan within 6 months. Moreover, the extent of restructuring was directly 
(though not exactly) related to the amount of aid granted.81 By contrast, the US approach 
                                                            
80  European Commission, ‘The Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in the Current Financial Crisis: 
Limitation of Aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards against Undue Distortions of Competition’ [2009] 
OJ C10/2. 
81  Though, as demonstrated by Laprévote, the ‘the tailoring of size reductions imposed to banks 
remains more an art at the Commission’s discretion than a science subject to precise mathematical rules’: see 
  
limited eligibility for recapitalization to banks that required between 1% and 3% of RWA 
(raised to 3% to 5% of RWA for banks with assets under $500,000), the idea being that 
banks that required more than 3% of RWA were destined to become insolvent. At the 
same time, the US recapitalization scheme did not provide for restructuring as a condition 
for the capital injection. The emphasis in TARP was on ensuring that all eligible 
(systemically important) banks would rapidly reach the required level of capitalization.82 
During a systemic crisis, however, the distinction between fundamentally sound 
and distressed banks is not as clear-cut as implied by the 2% threshold introduced by the 
Commission to distinguish between the two sets of banks. On the one hand, this threshold 
may have created a perverse incentive for banks to delay necessary restructuring, as it 
exacerbated their tendency to deliberately underestimate their capital needs (so as to 
minimize dilution and avoid restructuring), a strategy to which governments tend to be 
                                                                                                                                                                      
François-Charles Laprévote, ‘Selected Issues Raised by Bank Restructuring Plans under EU State Aid Rules’ 
[2012] European State Aid Law Quarterly 1, 105. 
82  The fact that the US government “forced” all systemically important banks to recapitalize is regarded 
by some as a pivotal feature of TARP’s success. See Pepper D. Culpepper and Raphael Reinke, ‘Structural 
Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States’ [2014] Politics and Society 42, 427. Of 
course, there was nothing in State aid policy to prevent member states from adopting a similar approach. 
Indeed, the French scheme, which has some similarities with the US scheme in that the French government 
exercised “moral suasion” in persuading all French banks to be recapitalized, is seen by some as having had a 
similar success. Note, however, that the scheme was kept below the 2% RAW threshold to avoid restructuring. 
The strategy was successful in restoring confidence in the French banking system on the capital markets. See 
Ben Hall and Scheherazade Daneshkhu, ‘French Banks Surge on State Injection’ Financial Times (21 October 
2008). See also Stéphanie Marie Stolz and Michael Wedow, ‘Government Measures in Support of the Financial 
Sector in the EU and the United States’ [2011] Intereconomics 46, 53. Some commentators have pointed out 
that French banks remained significantly undercapitalized even after these measures, e.g. Jakob Vestergaard 
and María Retana, ‘Behind Smoke and Mirrors: On the Alleged Capitalization of Europe’s Banks’ [2013] Danish 
Institute of International Affairs 10 <http://subweb.diis.dk/sw128648.asp> accessed 1 December 2015. 
  
sympathetic.83 On the other hand, the 2% threshold was based on an optimistic 
assessment of the ability of prudential capital requirements to capture the extent of the 
capital shortfall in banks that were (then) perceived to be fundamentally sound. Given the 
level of exposure of the largest European banks to sovereign debt even before the onset 
of sovereign debt crisis, the same banks that appeared to be financially sound in terms of 
their prudential capital were banks that would have (or should have) benefited from more 
robust levels of capital.84 It is entirely plausible, since sovereign debt did not feature on 
the denominator side of the prudential capital ratio, that building up optimal levels of 
capital would have required tipping the total amount injected over the 2% threshold. Yet, 
crossing that threshold would have caused the bank to be stigmatized as a “distressed” 
institution which, in turn, would have impacted on its share price and on its prospects of 
raising private capital in the short term.  
At the end of 2010, when the sovereign debt crisis had already taken its toll on the 
economies of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, the Commission lifted the 2% threshold, 
and extended the requirement to submit a restructuring plan to all banks, regardless of 
                                                            
83  Of course, in an ideal world, this strategy would be stopped in its tracks, as the national regulators of 
an ideal world would provide the Commission with a robustly accurate and fiercely independent 
representation of a bank’s financial situation and, in such a world, the Commission’s decision making would be 
free from any information asymmetry. One of the many examples of insufficient recapitalization can be seen 
in the MPS case cited above, where the bank initially benefited from a recapitalization in 2009, which was 
below the 2% RWA threshold and did not require a restructuring plan.  
84  Indeed, research based on data collected by the EBA shows that between 2009 and 2013 the level of 
sovereign exposure of the 54 largest Eurozone banks amounted to more than 200% of their tier 1 capital, with 
some banks having sovereign exposures as high as 15 to 20 times their regulatory capital. See Josef Korte and 
Sasha Steffen, ‘A “Sovereign Subsidy” – Zero Risk Weights and Sovereign Risk Spillovers’ VoxEu ( 7 September 
2014) <http://www.voxeu.org/article/sovereign-subsidy-zero-risk-weights-and-sovereign-risk-spillovers> 
accessed 18 April 2016. 
  
the size of the capital injection.85 It did so on the basis of a rather sanguine view of the 
renewed ability of banks to meet their capital needs without having to rely on State aid 
and against the evidence of a new credit crunch that had already begun to affect the so-
called “periphery” of the Eurozone.86 It was only a year later, as seen above, that the so-
called “proportionate assessment” was introduced.87 
In line with its role as competition regulator, the Commission’s emphasis was on 
keeping State aid to a minimum and on ensuring that aid beneficiaries would be able to 
return to viability; the objective of promoting stability was to be pursued in such a manner 
as to minimize distortions of competition and moral hazard. While the policy itself made 
clear that these objectives were to be mutually reconciled, in practice the emphasis on 
keeping intervention at a minimum inhibited bold State intervention to recapitalize 
national banking systems and to gradually wean banks off sovereign debt. In this sense, 
competition concerns prevailed over stability concerns. The focus on minimizing 
distortions of competition may also have had an indirect impact on the banks’ willingness 
to lend to the real economy, which remained anemic for a protracted period. Indeed, on 
occasion, the restructuring conditions imposed by the Commission seemed to be directly 
                                                            
85  Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2010] OJ C329/7, 8. 
86  For instance, the Financial Times reported that, since the downgrading of Portugal’s sovereign debt 
in April 2010, Portuguese banks had been virtually ‘frozen out’ of international capital markets. Victor Mallet 
and Peter Wise, ‘Eurozone Banks Hit by Return of Credit Crunch’ Financial Times (30 November 2010) 
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literature. See e.g. Ricardo Correa and Horacio Sapriza, ‘Sovereign Debt Crises’ (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers No 1104, May 2014). 
87  Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2011] OJ C356/7 [14]. 
  
at odds with the requirement to increase lending to the real economy. For instance, RBS 
was requested to divest its SME lending (a package of customers and branches designated 
as “Rainbow”) in order to address competition concerns in a sector – SME and mid-
corporate lending – in which it was dominant; at the same time RBS was required to 
observe lending targets to ensure that it would continue to lend to the real economy.88 
Levels of lending to the real economy may also have been affected by price leadership 
bans which were imposed as behavioral constraints to compensate competitors for the 
distortion of competition caused by the approval of the State aid measure. A particularly 
controversial price leadership ban was that imposed in separate decisions on three out of 
the four largest lenders on the Dutch mortgage market (ING, ABN-AMRO, AEGON).89 
These providers were prevented from offering a lower rate than that charged by their 
three best-priced direct competitors. As a consequence, Rabobank, the only Dutch lender 
not to have received State aid, was able to raise mortgage rates in the knowledge that its 
                                                            
88  Commission Decision in State aid N 422/09 and N 621/09 Restructuring of Royal Bank of Scotland 
[2010] OJ C119/01. The divestment proved challenging and disruptive, as emerged from the lengthy 
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being postponed. Commission Decision in State aid SA.38304 Amendment to the restructuring plan of Royal 
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continued lending to the real economy is articulated by Sir Nicholas MacPherson, Chief Secretary to the UK 
Treasury giving evidence before the UK House of Commons Treasury Select Committee in 2012. House Of 
Commons, ‘Oral Evidence Taken Before the Public Accounts Committee Report On HM Treasury's 2011/12 
Accounts’, Questions, 22 October 2012, 105-6 
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89  Commission Decision of 18 November 2009 on State aid No C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) 
implemented by the Netherlands for ING's Illiquid Assets Back-Up Facility and Restructuring Plan [2009] OJ 
L274/139; Commission Decision of 5 April 2011 on the Measures No C 11/2009 (ex NN 53b/2008, NN 2/2010 
and N 19/2010) implemented by Dutch State for ABN AMRO Group NV [2011] OJ L233. 
  
direct competitors had to follow suit – indeed, it has been suggested that the significant 
rise in mortgage rates on the Dutch market in 2009 may not have been purely 
coincidental.90 
Another distinctive feature of the European response to the financial crisis was 
the introduction of very substantial guarantee schemes on debt issued by banks. These 
schemes, the bulk of which were introduced in 2009, appear to have been successful in 
reducing funding costs for banks, one of the main causes of the credit crunch. Yet, until 
the beginning of 2012, the Commission’s policy on guarantees gave rise to significant 
distortions, as the pricing mechanism on such guarantees, which was based on ECB 
recommendations, failed to account for the significant correlation between a bank’s 
funding costs and the credit risk of its sovereign guarantor.91 As a result, it was observed 
that ‘in many instances “weak” banks from “strong” countries had access to cheaper 
funding than “strong” banks from “weak” countries’.92 When member states raised this 
concern in 2009, the Commission’s initial response was that the problem was inherent in 
the fact that ‘banks are located and choose to be located in different Member States’.93 It 
was only in 2012, after the yields on the sovereign debt of certain member states had 
                                                            
90  Mark A. Dijkstra, Fleur Randag and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, ‘High Mortgage Rates in the Low 
Countries: What Happened in the Spring of 2009?’ [2014] Journal of Competition Law and Economics 10, 843. 
91  Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on government 
guarantees for bank debt of 20 October 2008 
<http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/recommendations_on_guaranteesen.pdf> accessed 18 April 2016. 
92  Aviram Levy and Andrea Zaghini, ‘The Pricing of Government-guaranteed Bank Bonds’ [2011] Banks 
and Bank Systems 6, 16. 
93  European Commission, ‘DG Competition's Review of Guarantee and Recapitalisation Schemes in the 
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<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/review_of_schemes_en.pdf> accessed 18 April 2016, 
27. 
  
reached unsustainable levels, that this distortion was corrected by amending the pricing 
formula so as to reflect the creditworthiness of the sovereign backer.94 
What this overview illustrates is neither forbearance in State aid control, nor 
mission creep by State aid regulation into financial regulation. Certain policy choices made 
in the course of the financial and Eurozone crises may in retrospect appear questionable. 
However, the flaws in Commission decisions are more the product of inadequacies in 
regulatory systems at national, EU, and international levels, than the result of inherent 
weaknesses in the EU State aid regime. The catalogue of shortcomings at national level is 
too long to rehearse but the most immediate failing to have had an impact was the 
reluctance of national regulators to communicate the full extent of the losses incurred by 
banks from non-performing loans and toxic assets as well as their tendency to over-
estimate the viability of banks which led to piecemeal and/or belated interventions to 
strengthen core capital. For a time, such outward optimism appeared to be shared by the 
EU’s regulatory agency charged with assessing the capital positions of European banks 
which, in its first set of stress tests, famously gave Dexia a clean bill of health shortly 
before it had to be recapitalized. Moreover, the Commission’s assessment of 
recapitalization measures was shaped by what was until relatively recently a consensus 
among regulators at all levels over the measurement of prudential capital, over risk 
weighting in general, and in particular over the weight to be attributed to sovereign debt. 
It would be unreasonable, even in light of what we now know, to expect the Commission’s 
Directorate of Competition (DG COMP) to depart from conventional wisdom in an area 
                                                            
94  The formula was based on the ratio of the median five-year senior CDS spread of all member states 
to the median five-year senior CDS spread of the member state granting the guarantee. See Annex to 
Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2011] OJ C356/7. 
  
which was already outside of its comfort zone; or, for that matter, to disregard the 
recommendations of the ECB in relation to the pricing of guarantees.  
 
3.  Transition to Banking Union 
 
As noted in the first section of this chapter the manner in which Europe experienced the 
financial crisis that began in 2008 revealed that the actions member states took to 
stabilize their own financial institutions and to protect the interests of their depositors 
was motivated by the need to minimize the call on the member states’ own fiscal 
resources. There was scant concern in national financial ministries for spillover effects 
elsewhere in the single market from these banks’ cross-border operations. Of far greater 
concern to member states was the need to avoid the bank and payment system failure on 
their own soil. Andenas and Chiu, in a powerful critique of the conflation of market 
integration and financial stability, make the important point that appears to continue to 
be overlooked at the level of European policy making,95 that these two policy objectives 
                                                            
95  Witness the ECJ’s rejection of the UK’s arguments about systemic risk and financial stability in UK v 
European Parliament and Council 2014. Further evidence of European institutional resistance to any sense 
that the different peoples and societies within Europe’s border may have differing priorities and levels of 
tolerance for and ability to withstand risk to the banking system was apparent in the difficulties experienced in 
implementing the Basel III Capital Accord. The UK and European Commission took very different views on the 
nature of systemic risk and the sources of financial instability that it made for great difficulty in reaching 
agreement on the final texts of the Capital Requirements Directive and Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRDIV). These differences centered around the extent to which member state authorities could impose 
higher capital requirements on its systemically important banks judged to pose particular risk to national 
financial stability and national taxpayers. See Stephen Kinsella and Vincent O’Sullivan, ‘Regulatory Complexity 
and Uncertainty the Capital Requirements Directive IV’ (Blog Post 19 May 2012 
<http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/19/regulatory-complexity-and-uncertainty-the-capital-
requirements-directive-iv/#5> accessed 18 April 2016). The compromise that emerged takes effect through 
  
have entirely different meanings and serve different sets of interests and may in fact be in 
direct conflict insofar as market integration of banks’ operations across European borders 
can be the very fuel of financial instability and systemic risk.96 
 However, it is no surprise that the turmoil across the European banking system 
was seen by European policy makers as an opportunity to further strengthen European 
competence in financial supervision rather than to pause and reflect on the risks of 
further integration of cross-border financial intermediation activity within Europe. To call 
time out and to reflect in greater depth on what purposes and whose interests banking 
activity is there to serve in the first place has yet to percolate through to mainstream 
policy debate within Europe. 
Therefore it was not surprising that the Commission’s mandate to conduct a 
Europe-level inquiry into the causes of, and remedies for, the financial crisis was relatively 
narrow, and had built into it an assumption that the appropriate response to the risks and 
problems caused by market integration was to achieve greater supervisory integration. In 
2008 a high-level group of experts under the chairmanship of Jacques de Larosière was 
‘requested to make proposals to strengthen European supervisory arrangements covering 
all financial sectors, with the objective to establish a more efficient, integrated and 
sustainable European system of supervision’.97 The publication in February 2009 of the 
report of this group, widely referred to as the “de Larosière Report”, was swiftly followed 
up by two Commission Communications. The first of these, entitled ‘Driving European 
Recovery’, signaled that it saw a stable and reliable financial system as key to driving 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Article 133 Capital Requirements Directive Article 458 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 [2013] OJ L176/1; its 
effect is summarized in a letter of 29 March 2012 from Mario Draghi writing as Chair of the European Systemic 
Risk Board to the Council, Commission and Parliament ESRB/2012/0050. 
96  Mads Andenas and Iris H.-Y. Chiu, ‘Financial Stability and Legal Integration in Financial Regulation’ 
[2013] European Law Review 38, 335. 
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forward economic recovery across Europe and signaled a major program of substantive 
law reform would be proposed for the financial sector at European level.98 The second, 
entitled ‘European Financial Supervision’, proposed the creation of the four new European 
bodies, the EBA, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Systemic Risk 
Council (‘Council’ became ‘Board’ and it now bears the acronym ESRB). 99 These bodies 
replaced the old pre-crisis “Lamfalussy Committees”-based architecture and, in the case of 
the EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, were to comprise the new European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) and take principal responsibility for developing and implementing rules 
and standards for, and oversight of, financial sector institutions operating in the European 
single market. They were to work towards developing a Single Rulebook for the various 
financial market sectors and would, in tandem with national competent authorities, 
ensure that application and enforcement of that rulebook was consistent across the single 
market. In the case of the European Systemic Risk Council/Board it assumed responsibility 
for macro-prudential oversight of, and responsibility for, the European financial system as 
whole. In June 2010 the Commission published a further Communication100 which 
proposed an ambitious program to harmonize and strengthen European level regulation 
of financial services and much of this has been enacted by now and forms the basis of the 
ESFS’ Single Rulebook. Quaglia examines Europe’s post-crisis tidal wave of detailed 
institutional and substantive law reform from the perspective of what it tells us about 
shifts in the competing political and ideological groupings that drive European policy 
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making in the financial sector. She sees these competing groups as being a ‘market-
making’ coalition and a ‘market-shaping’ coalition  where ‘the market-making approach 
emphasized the objectives of competition and market efficiency, whereas the market-
shaping approach privileged the objectives of financial stability and consumer protection, 
as well as forms of veiled protectionism’.101 She detects a change of emphasis within the 
market-making coalition insofar as the heightened emphasis on financial stability. The UK 
in particular pushed for reforms to prudential regulation of its systemically important 
banks and this led to a retreat from a less interventionist model of banking regulation.102 
At the same time the market shaping coalition, she argues, seized the political opportunity 
of crisis and used it to push a more consumer protective regulatory agenda accompanied 
by an expansion of European legislative competence that was justified by the need for 
financial stability rather than a need for greater emphasis on competition and market 
efficiency. These latter two values appear to be waning within banking regulation.  
 
a) From bank rescues to sovereign refinancings 
 
Despite these extensive reforms to European supervision and substantive European 
regulation of the financial sector, 2010 saw the start of what became a series of eruptions 
in the markets for government bonds in a number of European countries within the 
Eurozone. Some of these governments now encountered solvency and liquidity problems 
of their own in ways that at times mirrored the banks in the preceding years. Contagion 
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spread throughout the rest of the monetary zone and borrowing for many other Eurozone 
countries became more expensive and the value of the Euro suffered as a consequence. 
The mandate of the ECB constrained it from doing anything that would amount to direct 
or indirect financing of a member state and its treaty objective to pursue price stability 
prevented it from engaging in the type of monetary policy that might have stabilized 
confidence in the markets.103 The episodes during the crisis in Eurozone government bond 
markets along with the development of a series of ad hoc policies in response culminated 
in an Intergovernmental Treaty being concluded on March 2012 whereby Eurozone 
governments and several non-Eurozone member states pooled sovereignty as to decision 
making over public finances and macroeconomic governance and established a European 
Stability Mechanism.104 These developments are extensively discussed elsewhere and will 
not be covered in detail or critiqued in this chapter.105 For the instant purpose their 
significance lies in the fact that the sovereign debt problems within the Eurozone were 
seen to be due in major part to the cost of government support to their banks as well as 
the bond markets’ judgment of the fiscal risk posed by continuing weakness of their 
banks.106 This led to the problems within the Eurozone being characterized as a result of a 
vicious circle linking the solvency of banks and of sovereign governments in their place of 
establishment and this feedback effect was seen as imperiling financial stability in the 
wider Eurozone. Realization dawned that a strengthening and deepening of the 
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integration of the arrangements for supervision of all banks and some degree of 
mutualization of the cost of resolution of troubled banks was needed within the Eurozone 
and so the first of a series of steps towards what is now termed Banking Union was taken 
by the Commission in September 2012. The Commission set out its plans as being part of a 
‘longer term vision of fiscal and economic integration’ and signaled the need for 
‘[...s]hifting the supervision of banks to the European level [….] which must subsequently 
be combined with other steps such as a common system for deposit protection, and 
integrated bank crisis management’.107 The various legislative changes that have ensued 
since 2012 have resulted in a Banking Union resting on three pillars: (i) the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)108; (ii) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)109;  and (iii) 
the Single Rulebook.110 This last pillar, which is formulated and overseen by the EBA in 
conjunction with national supervisory authorities, applies throughout the entire single 
market for banking, and covers banks in non-Euro states as well. Conversely, the SSM, 
which is in fact a new set of functions and a discrete operating unit within the ECB, and 
the SRM, administered by an independent Single Resolution Board and containing within 
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it a Single Resolution Fund (SRF), while technically open to participation by non-Eurozone 
states, owe their design and raison d’être to the perceived needs of countries within the 
Eurozone. No non-Eurozone States have joined the SSM and the SRM and as a result a 
new reality is emerging for economic governance and banking regulation within Europe.111 
Europe is a two-layered governance space consisting of a wider single market within 
which banks are ostensibly free to operate across borders and compete on a level playing 
field with those banks established within Eurozone states which are subject to ECB 
supervision and intervention and stabilization measures from the SRM with those costs of 
future resolution of banks within the SSM (insofar as these costs are not borne by bank 
shareholders and creditors)112 being shared out among all banks and governments of 
Eurozone States (within very strict limits).113 
The 2012 Commission Communication mapping out the route to Banking Union 
was followed up by a second Communication in 2014114 which gave an exhaustive account 
of all the substantive law and institutional reforms that had taken place since 2008 to 
strengthen Europe’s financial sector, as well as how the emergent Banking Union would 
bring stability to the markets and member states most affected by turmoil within 
monetary union. Although both Communications place financial stability firmly at the core 
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of all the reforms discussed and explained there is only a single reference made to 
competition in relation to proposed structural reforms115 of systemically important 
banks.116 Issues such as the importance to resilience of the financial system of fostering 
more general competition in financial intermediation within Europe are not discussed.117 
Neither is there any consideration of the level of risk of moral hazard attendant on the 
reforms that are discussed. More recent explanatory material on Banking Union,118 along 
with the Commission videos on how the different elements of Banking Union knit together 
and function, paint a reassuring picture from the point of view of financial stability of both 
banks and the banking system within the Eurozone but make scant mention of 
competition or competitiveness within the internal market.119 Scrutiny of the legislative 
texts that establish and empower the SSM and SRM reveals that the need to minimize 
moral hazard and to remain vigilant to risks to financial stability feature prominently in the 
mandates of both of these mechanisms. Yet how decisions taken within them might 
                                                            
115  Following the 2012 Report from the High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU 
banking sector <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf > accessed 
12 May 2016 (the Likkanen Report), the text of a proposed regulation was adopted by the Commission and 
agreed by ECOFIN for structural reform of EU banks (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Structural Measures Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions /* COM/2014/043 
final - 2014/0020 (COD) */).  
116  Commission Communication 2014, at 7-8  
117  ESRB, ‘Is Europe Overbanked?’ (Report of the Advisory and Scientific Committee of the European 
Systemic Risk Board, June 2014 <https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_ASC_4_1406.pdf> 
accessed 18 April 2016. 
118  Explanatory Memorandum Commission Newsletter of 2 February 2015, ‘Understanding Banking 
Union’ <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/fisma/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=20758&newsletter_id=166&lang=en> accessed 18 April 2016. 
119  The 2012 Communication on Banking Union gives occasional emphasis on the integrity of the 
internal market but makes no mention of the need to ensure a competitive banking market. 
  
impact upon the overall efficiency and competitiveness of financial intermediation within 
Europe is an issue that is largely avoided save for the requirement for the SRB to take 
steps to ensure that the State aid regime and its decision-making processes are observed 
in any use of the SRF.120 
 
b) State aid and the new framework for bank resolution  
 
By requiring bail-in as a pre-condition for State aid, the recent Commission practice under 
the 2013 Banking Communication has provided a dry run for the incoming regulatory 
framework for bank recovery and resolution.121 The coming into force of the latter 
however does not consign the policy and practice developed during the financial crisis to 
legal history. That experience has not only shaped the new regulatory framework, but 
remains relevant even as the new rules come into effect.122 Moreover, the trade-offs 
between competition, stability and moral hazard that were highlighted above are bound 
to recur in the future, albeit in different and unpredictable ways. There is general 
agreement among commentators that the type of idiosyncratic/endogenous risk that 
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caused the demise of Crédit Lyonnais may be resolved effectively through bail-in.123 
However, some have expressed concern that bail-in may run into insurmountable 
obstacles in the context of a systemic crisis, in particular, where large interconnected 
banks are concerned.124 While one may retort that bail-in has already been applied in 
State aid practice since 2013 without triggering contagion, these cases only go part of the 
way towards dispelling doubts over the future effectiveness of the new regulatory 
framework because their context is a far cry from that of October 2008 which would be 
the real test for the resilience of the new system.125 
In effect, both the BRRD and the Banking Communication contain safeguard 
clauses which allow for some degree of State intervention independent of bail-in. The 
BRRD contemplates that State aid may be granted without triggering resolution (which is 
normally a consequence of “extra-ordinary public financial assistance”, i.e. State aid), 
provided that the aid is approved by the Commission, if the State measures are of a 
precautionary and temporary nature and are proportionate to remedy the consequences 
of the serious disturbance and are not being used to offset losses that the institution has 
incurred or is likely to incur in the near future. Recapitalizations are permitted to the 
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extent that they are precautionary, i.e. they address a capital shortfall, as opposed to 
covering losses, identified through a stress test, asset quality review or equivalent exercise 
by the competent supervisory authority, and provided that the aid is temporary and the 
bank is solvent.126 The Banking Communication (point 45) provides for an exception to 
burden-sharing where conversion or bail-in would threaten financial stability and where it 
would be disproportionate e.g. where the amount of aid is relatively small.127 The 
rationale of these combined exceptions is that in a systemic crisis, even solvent banks may 
require urgent intervention.  
Some may regard this exception to burden sharing as having the potential to 
increase moral hazard and to create distortions of competition. Much will depend on the 
effectiveness of the interaction between the relevant regulators, who will be required to 
assess the existence of the capital shortfall and the Commission, and how strictly the link 
between bail-in and systemic risk is interpreted. With regard to the issue of regulatory 
cooperation, the fragmentation that characterizes financial supervision even after the 
Banking Union does not rule out the possibility of discrepancies in the way in which capital 
shortfalls are identified and in the promptness with which shortfalls are flagged up.128 As 
far as the Commission is concerned, however, if it is true that during the financial crisis the 
absence of a pan-European framework for bank resolution was at the root of its readiness 
to accept the systemic importance of every bank, by analogy and by contrast the presence 
of such a framework is likely to yield a rigorous interpretation of the link between bail-in 
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and systemic risk.129 Since the Banking Communication entered into effect on 1 August 
2013, there have been no instances of this exception being applied in the Commission’s 
decision-making. Nonetheless, given the crucial importance of early recapitalizations for 
the effective management of a systemic crisis, this guarded flexibility is to be 
welcomed.130 
A striking novelty of the Banking Union is the new role assigned to State aid 
control in the context of the SRM. While the SRM falls short of expectations in terms of 
providing a common fiscal backstop, its SRF is intended to replace taxpayer funds with 
mutualized funds originating from the banks. Given the private origin of its resources, and 
that these resources are not managed by member states but by an agency of the EU, the 
use of the SRF would not normally fall within the scope of the notion of State aid in light of 
Article 107(1) TFEU. Yet Article 19 of the SRM Regulation, which draws on the TFEU’s State 
aid provisions, ensures that Fund aid is subject to the same regime as State aid. The point 
of this provision is to ensure the substantive coherence of EU law, that is, that different 
areas of EU law are mutually compatible. In the case of the SRM, this concern for 
coherence takes on a heightened significance as the avoidance of asymmetries that 
translate into potential distortions of competition in the internal market is a key challenge 
of the Banking Union. Thus, through its State aid/Fund aid control, the Commission is 
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tasked with the constitutionally pivotal role of protecting the interests of non-Banking 
Union member states in order to safeguard the integrity of the internal market.  
 
4.  Concluding comments 
 
State aid law and policy display remarkable openness to the concerns that animate 
financial regulation and, to a certain extent, employs concepts such as moral hazard that 
are central to financial regulation. However, a number of challenges come with this 
openness. First, there is a certain fuzziness about systemic risk and moral hazard, which 
affects the congruence between theory, policy and practice. This was particularly true 
during the sovereign debt crisis in which State aid policy appeared to struggle with the 
collective moral hazard problem and, at times, the Commission’s practice appeared to 
struggle to fit with its own policy on State aid. Second, the language of “reconciling” 
multiple regulatory objectives tends to obfuscate some difficult trade-offs that occur in 
attempting to pursue stability, the prevention of moral hazard and the preservation of 
lending to the real economy simultaneously, while attempting to minimize distortions of 
competition. The natural inclination of State aid policy is to focus on keeping State aid to a 
minimum in order  to reduce the resulting distortions of competition. Yet this policy did 
not succeed in overcoming the inherent resistance of governments and banks towards 
building up adequate capital buffers and may have exacerbated the tendency of 
undercapitalized banks to gamble for resurrection. The comparison with the US TARP 
recapitalization scheme is at the same time misleading and instructive. It is misleading 
because it neglects the significant differences between the two objects of the comparison. 
The Commission’s role as competition regulator in a supranational organization that lacks 
fiscal competence could only go so far in shaping intervention by national governments. 
The comparison is instructive as it sheds some light on the effectiveness of the member 
  
states’ response and on the extent to which that response was influenced or constrained 
by State aid policy. As the dust has settled on the financial crisis, and to some extent on 
the Eurozone crisis, reflecting on these challenges and on possible interactions between 
State aid policy and national bailout design is an exercise that is worth engaging in as a 
new regulatory and economic environment sets in. In principle, the response to future 
crises should take an altogether different form, as shareholders and creditors and 
uninsured depositors will take the hit before any outlay of public funds. Whether this will 
turn out to be the case in extreme scenarios such as the one that materialized in October 
2008 is open to question. Yet the challenge of the new regime for bank recovery and 
resolution is not limited to ensuring the robustness of the bail-in mechanism, but also to 
preserving the integrity of the internal market. As the institution charged with the control 
of both SRF aid and State aid (from non-Banking Union member states), the Commission 
will continue to play a crucial role in the context of banking crises. However, this role will 
not only focus on preventing or limiting distortions of competition in the banking sector, 
but also preventing or limiting jurisdictional competition between Banking Union “ins” and 
“outs”. The positive features131 and shortcomings132 in the design of Banking Union have 
been widely discussed with suggestions made to improve its efficacy.133 It is an 
experiment in governance that is uniquely European. To the extent to which it represents 
real agreement amongst the Eurozone member states to integrate sovereignty over, and 
to share the burden of, any future bail-outs of the financial institutions that operate 
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within them, it marks a step in political integration. How the decisions taken within the 
Banking Union will impact upon the competiveness of the wider single market, and take 
account of and relate to the values underlying the State aid and competition law 
framework of that wider European space, is of profound interest going forward.  
 
